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Hindutva’s Dangerous Rewriting of
History
Audrey Truschke
I thank Supriya Gandhi, Taymiya Zaman, and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments
on earlier drafts of this essay.
1 In January 2019, the Indian Science Congress convened for its 106th annual meeting,
which turned out to feature not science so much as science fiction. Presenters told
attendees  that  ancient  Indians  were  proficient  in  stem  cell  technology  and  built
aircrafts, among other fantasies (Kumar 2019; Thiagarajan 2019). This was hardly the
first time this forum had suffered from such antics. The 2015 Indian Science Congress
meeting  included  a  presentation  on  how  ancient  Indians  had  planes  capable  of
interplanetary travel (Shrivastav 2015). Claims abound more broadly among Hindutva
supporters  about  ancient  India  boasting  everything  from  the  internet  to  modern
medicine. The idea that modern science and aeronautics flourished in India thousands
of years ago is anachronistic and ridiculous to degrees so absurd it seems odd to even
bother to contradict such nonsense. After all, no sane person could actually think that
ancient  Indians surfed the web while  they waited to  board a  flight  to  Mars,  right?
Certainly,  no  historically-minded  person  could  endorse  such  lunacy,  but  Hindu
nationalists, who are often willing to sacrifice reason in pursuit of political objectives,
are another matter. 
2 Hindu nationalism or Hindutva—a fascist ideology that advocates Hindu supremacy,
especially over Muslims—champions an outlandish vision of how scientific modernity
flourished in early India; this is part of a larger agenda to rewrite the Indian past to
serve present-day political interests. The overarching aim of Hindutva is to transform
India from a secular into an ethno-nationalist state, dubbed the Hindu Rashtra (Hindu
nation). As I explore in further detail below, Hindutva ideologues chart their path to
this fascist future, in part, by making a series of wrong assertions, to varying degrees of
unbelievability, about the past. Hindutva has a fact problem in that the vast majority of
their claims about premodern India are incorrect. But their falsehoods about history—
many of  which center  around an imagined Hindu golden age of  scientific  progress
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interrupted by Muslim invaders who sought to crush Hindu culture and peoples—serve
clear political goals of projecting a modern Hindutva identity as an ancient bulwark of
Indian  culture  and  maligning  Muslims  as  the  ultimate  Other.  In  short,  making
outrageous claims about the Indian past makes no sense historically, but it makes good
sense politically.
3 Hindutva ahistoricity  has  accelerated since  the Bharatiya  Janata  Party  (BJP)—which
embraces Hindutva as part of its platform—took over India’s central government in
2014. The championing of Hindutva myths about the past has also expanded out from
social media and political environments, two contexts hardly known for their devotion
to accuracy,  into academic circles.  Hindu nationalists  have become more brazen in
introducing ahistorical claims into school textbooks,  as discussed at the end of this
article. They have also targeted traditionally academic spaces, a prime example being
the Indian Science Congress, discussed above. The Indian Science Congress was founded
in 1914 and today boasts a robust membership of tens of thousands of scientists. But
the group’s mission to “advance and promote the cause of science in India” is being
undermined  by  the  introduction  of  Hindu  nationalist  ideas  at  its  meetings.1 As
Hindutva  ideology  exerts  increasing  influence  within  both  popular  and  academic
spheres, it becomes more pressing for academics to describe, document, and analyze
harmful  Hindutva  approaches  to  remolding  Indian  history  and  distinguish  these
political uses of the past from academic approaches to history. In this article, I outline
some of the patterns in how Hindutva ideologues construct a fanciful past and, now
that they enjoy broad political power in India, how they disseminate their mythology,
which  often  supplants  scholarly  inquiry.  I  argue  that  outlandish  Hindutva  claims
regarding the past are most fruitfully understood to be, in the end, about present-day
goals and anxieties.  Nonetheless,  Hindutva interventions have deep implications for
both popular and academic understandings of Indian history.
 
Denying Change over Time
4 There is more than a touch of irony in the investment of many modern-day Hindu
nationalists in the past, given that they often deny their own movement’s unsavory
history.  Early  Hindutva  ideologues  were  inspired  by  fascist  movements  in  early
twentieth-century Europe. A key early Hindutva thinker, V.D. Savarkar, spoke of India
as the Fatherland and also shared with Nazis a concern with the purity of bloodlines
(Savarkar 1923).  Savarkar  and  others  found  Hitler’s  treatment  of  the  Jews  a  useful
model  for  how to  deal  with  India’s  Muslim minority.  For  instance,  M.S.  Golwalkar,
second leader of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, the largest Hindu nationalist
organization),  wrote  that  Germany’s  “purging the country of  the Semitic  Race—the
Jews” was “a good lesson for us in Hindusthan to learn and profit by.”2 It chills one’s
blood to read such vitriol, especially given that men (among other vices, Hindutva is
deeply invested in male dominance) who follow such teachings govern India today. The
RSS, which serves as the chief organizer for a range of Hindu nationalist groups and
shapes  BJP  policy,  was  founded  as  and  remains  today  a  paramilitary  organization
(Jaffrelot 1996). The RSS’s most well-known contribution to Indian history is that one of
its members, Nathuram Godse, assassinated Mahatma Gandhi.3 The list of lowlights in
Hindutva’s own history goes on. Perhaps part of what motivates Hindutva thinkers to
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invent  a  deeper  Indian past  is  longing for  what  they  themselves  do  not  have  as  a
political movement: a history they might be proud of.
5 Hindutva ideologues also care about the past because they think it can provide them
with a rich heritage that informs what it means to be Hindu today. Many historians,
myself included, agree with the general impulse to understand where we came from in
order to think about who we are in the present and who we might become in the
future. But we part ways with Hindutva ideologues on several scores. First, whereas
historians strive for accuracy and to understand the past on its own terms, followers of
Hindutva forefront their modern identity and seek to invent a past that justifies it. In
terms of specifics, Hindutva followers conceive of Hindu identity as having little to do
with  faith  (Savarkar  was  an  atheist).  Rather,  in  Hindutva  thought,  Hindu-ness  (the
literal meaning of Hindutva) is a sort of martial machismo rooted in a shared cultural
background that stretches back to time immemorial. Historians assess this Hindutva
vision of what it has meant, historically, to be Hindu, to be factually problematic in
multiple regards, but we also part ways on a broader methodological point.
6 Historians  study  change  over  time,  whereas  Hindutva  ideologues  deny  that  such
change  exists,  vis-à-vis  Hindu  identity  in  particular.  For  historians,  then,  there  is
nothing surprising or challenging in the bland truism that Hindu identity did not exist
in the same way in the Indian past as it does in India’s present. But Hindutva thinkers
reject cultural change as a desirable process, and so they find political value in the
originally Orientalist proposition that India and Indians (for them, Hindus) possess a
timeless,  changeless  essence  (e.g.,  MacDonell  1900:11;  Mill [1817]  1967;  Hegel [1837]
1900).4 This embrace of sameness over time and space has widespread implications for
Hindutva followers.  It  leads them to make exceptional  claims and act  in ways that
otherwise seem inexplicable. I explore further some of these ideas and actions in the
next section. This commitment to a flat history without change, really a non-history,
also  means  that  Hindutva  ideologues  perceive  anything  that  contradicts  their
worldview, even things buried deep in the ancient past,  as a visceral contemporary
threat.
 
The Oxymoron of Hindutva History
7 For  Hindutva followers,  one critical  aspect  of  what  it  means to  be  “Hindu,”  in  the
peculiar way that they define that term, is to be indigenous to India. Immediately, then,
we have a historical problem, since, if one goes back far enough, no group is originally
from India. The first humans likely migrated, at the earliest, around 120,000 years ago
as homo sapiens spread beyond Africa (the first humans to leave a surviving lineage
probably arrived on the Indian subcontinent about 65,000 years ago). Both material and
genetic  evidence  supports  the  dates  of  these  migrations  (Joseph  2018:17).  A  later
migration to the subcontinent—which Hindutva followers judge as especially damning
to their ideology—occurred about 4,000 to 3,500 years ago, when a pastoralist group
arrived in  the northwestern part  of  the  subcontinent.  These people  probably  came
from Central Asia, called themselves Aryans, and revered the Vedas, the oldest Sanskrit
texts. This event, known today as the Aryan migration, is backed by nearly ironclad
linguistic evidence and further buttressed by recent genetic research (Joseph 2018:161–
202). But, for Hindutva thinkers, the Aryan Migration Theory threatens to overthrow
their entire worldview because it means, to them, that Hindus are not indigenous to
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India. It is worth underscoring that few people, beyond Hindu nationalists, think that
the Aryan migration invalidates Hindu claims to be Indian. After all, 3,500 years is a
long time. Also, Hinduism has changed rather radically over the millennia, and so, as
scholars have pointed out, it is arguably inaccurate to identify the migrating Aryans, a
small  band  of  pastoralists,  with  modern-day  Hindus,  a  diverse  group  of  people
(Hawley 1991). But Hindutva ideologues do not embrace historical change, as discussed
above. And so,  in pursuit of an unchallengeable claim to indigeneity within a (they
imagine) static, unalterable India, they attempt to deny any history of Aryan migration
to the subcontinent.
8 In an attempt to navigate around the formidable roadblocks of linguistic, genetic, and
material  evidence  for  early  migrations  to  India,  especially  by  the  Aryans,  Hindu
nationalists resort to specious arguments and even fraud. Hindutva thinkers propagate
an Out of India theory, which stipulates that Sanskrit-speaking Aryans originated in
India and from there traveled to the rest of the world. As Tony Joseph has pointed out,
the Out  of  India  theory lacks support  from even “a single,  peer-reviewed scientific
paper” and is best considered nothing “more than a kind of clever and angry retort.”5
Hindu  nationalists  also  often  claim  that  the  Indus  Valley  Civilization,  an  ancient
civilization in the northwestern subcontinent that declined a few hundred years before
the Aryans arrived,  was continuous with Vedic culture.  Followers of  Hindutva have
gone  to  astonishing  lengths  of  dishonesty—including  fabricating  evidence  entirely,
such as a horse seal—to attempt to show that the Indus Valley Civilization and Vedic
culture  are  one  in  the  same (Witzel  and  Farmer 2000).  Similar  to  the  Out  of  India
theory, there is no academic substance to this hollow claim. 
9 Hindutva ideologues want Hindus alone to be indigenous to India so that this one social
group can define what it means to be Indian and can exclude others from this category.
They exclude as non-Indian many groups who have long been part of life and society on
the  subcontinent,  above  all  Muslims.  In  Hindutva  history—oxymoron  though  that
phrase  is—premodern  India  had  two  major  phases:  a  glorious  Hindu  golden  age
followed by an era of Muslim oppression of Hindus. When describing the latter, Hindu
nationalists  like  Narendra  Modi  speak  of  “1,200  years  of  slavery”  (Suroor 2014).
Propaganda websites, such as IndiaFacts, are full of bad-faith allegations of a Muslim-
led “Hindu Holocaust” in premodernity. As with the Out of India theory, I am not aware
of a single scholarly work that argues for either proposition. Indo-Muslim rulers were
no more  or  less  violent,  as  a  broad  group,  than  Hindu  rulers,  and  they  generally
targeted political enemies, not broad religious groups.6 But, as Supriya Gandhi (2020)
explains in a  recent article  about Hindutva’s  iconoclastic  activities  vis-à-vis  Muslim
monuments, “Hindu nationalism centers around grievance and the desire to correct—
or avenge—past wrongs.”7 These largely imagined grievances have a history of their
own, which is important for understanding how they have come to exert power over
the  imaginations  of  some  members  of  India’s  dominant  religious  group  (Hindus
comprise nearly eighty percent of modern India’s population).
10 In historical terms, the list of grievances brandished by Hindu nationalists dates back
primarily to the British colonial period (1757–1947). Hindutva advocates have little to
say about British colonialism, a brutal period of Indian history, because doing so does
not serve their political purposes today. Hindutva’s early ideologues were sometimes
British  sympathizers,  and  overall,  Hindu  nationalists  sat  out  India’s  struggle  for
independence. Today, the tools that once served India’s British masters now serve their
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Hindu nationalist ones. For instance, Narendra Modi, India’s BJP leader and a lifelong
RSS man, has not hesitated to make use of draconian British-era laws—such as laws
against sedition—in pursuit of his own dark ends (Guha 2019). Hindutva followers have
a similarly symbiotic relationship with their once colonial masters regarding history.
The  two  centerpieces  of  the  Hindu  nationalist  view  of  the  Indian  past—the
demonization of Muslim-led rule and idolization of Hindu-led rule—both stem from the
colonial  period,  during  which  modern  Hindu-Muslim  communal  conflict  was  born
(Thapar 2016).8 For the British, these ideas assisted their strategy of divide-and-rule.
Also, demonizing India’s Muslim kings, the direct predecessors of the British in ruling
over significant portions of the subcontinent, furthered the argument that British rule
was needed in India. Hindu nationalists decline to recognize the imperialist intellectual
lineage of their ideas presumably to avert exposing their historical fictions as such.
They also perhaps wish to avoid confronting the broader implications of the reality
that Hindutva thought has inherited British colonial tactics and attitudes.
11 While giving the British a pass, Hindu nationalists blame seemingly all wrongs in Indian
history on Muslims. In addition to that being hateful and incorrect, it is notable that
Hindu nationalists rarely distinguish between groups of Muslims, whether past versus
present,  or  those  with  political  power  versus  those  without,  and  so  forth.  Since
Hindutva ideology seeks Hindu supremacy, the enemy that serves as their foil must be
constructed  as  equally  flat  and  politically  homogenous  in  its  identity.  Hindu
nationalists avenge their imagined grievances through very real oppression of present-
day  Indian  Muslims,  who  have  been  the  victims  of  increasing  government-led  and
extrajudicial  violence  since  2014  (Ayyub 2019;  Bajoria 2019;  Filkins 2019).  In  other
words,  Hindutva followers  remake the past  in  a  futile  attempt to  justify  their  own
bigoted hate and violence in the present.
12 According  to  Hindutva  ideologues,  before  Muslim  baddies  showed  up  on  the
subcontinent, India was a paradise of scientific progress. Above I detail some aspects of
this vision to project modern Western advances into the Indian past. Comments made
by a leader in the Vijnana Bharati (VIBHA), the RSS’s science wing, indicate that this
exercise in absurdity is fuelled, in part, by anxiety and shame. Speaking about the 106th
Indian Science Congress debacle, Shekhar Mande, vice-president of VIBHA, said, “We
are a race which is not inferior to any other race in the world” and “Great things have
happened in this part of the world.” These statements strike me as generally true,9 but
they are only pertinent as a defense of projecting modern science into ancient India if
lacking modern science means that one’s culture is weak and inferior. This logic and its
underlying “simmering science envy” (Nanda 2016) do not jibe with the reality that
premodern India was neither modern nor Western. The view of many scholars on this
point is put aptly by Sheldon Pollock (2007) who wrote in a discussion of historical
writing in premodern India, “There is no shame in premodernity” (p. 381). But Hindu
nationalists seem to feel deep anxiety about the truism that ancient India was not the
modern West. They inherited this embarrassment about the Indian past, again, from
the  British  colonial  period  when  Orientalist  scholarship  demeaned  much  about
premodern  India.  Historians  escape  the  clutches  of  such  inappropriate  views  by
naming, analyzing, and ultimately replacing them. But that avenue of critical thought
is not open to Hindu nationalists, who are invested in both denying historical change
and avoiding their own ideology’s history. One result is that Hindu nationalists are still
shackled by Orientalist shame, which lurks just beneath the surface when they seek to
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co-opt scientific discoveries made in the modern West—such as airplanes and genetic
therapy—as the work of their own ancestors.
13 Hindu nationalists also sometimes claim that premodern Indian practices (or what they
imagine were premodern Indian practices anyways) are superior to anything in the
West, either in the past or the present. This trend cuts against the tendency to project
modern scientific  advances  onto ancient  India,  and such contradictions  are  part  of
Hindutva,  which  “seeks  its  own  coherence”  while  “in  it  dwell  numerous
contradictions” (Gandhi 2019). Positioning ancient Indian practices as superlative to all
others in the world has some eye-catching outcomes. For instance, in March of 2020,
days after the World Health Organization declared the novel coronavirus outbreak to
be  a  pandemic,  the  Akhil  Bharat  Hindu  Mahasabha  organized  a  party  at  which
attendees consumed cow urine as preventative medicine against the virus.10 Cow urine
(gaumutra)  is  a  recurrent  cure  in  Hindu  nationalist  lore  for  all  manner  of  health
problems—including cancer,  thyroid issues,  and infections—and its  champions often
emphasize its roots in premodern Indian medicine (Penkar 2020).  Modern people in
many cultures are interested in homeopathy these days, and urine therapy also has
white Western followers (Nagesh 2018). But the patronage of the Indian government
and broader Hindutva mythology render such practices more than mere curiosities in
Modi’s India. The coronavirus gaumutra party was part of a larger recent push towards
“traditional” medicine, endorsed by the BJP, that predates the coronavirus pandemic.
Notably, since coming to power in 2014, the Modi government has devoted significant
resources to AYUSH (Ministry of Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and
Homoeopathy),  a  government  ministry  of  homeopathy  with  a  troubling  history  of
undercutting scientifically-backed cures.11 In this course of action, then, there is clear
harm on a systemic level to medical care in modern India, which Hindu nationalists
accept in pursuit of political power.
14 Hindutva thinkers mine the past for symbols at times, with a prime example being their
curious attachment to Sanskrit as an affective cultural marker coupled with disinterest
in reading premodern Sanskrit texts. Sanskrit is the premier literary and intellectual
language  of  premodern India;  it  also  serves  ritual  functions  in  Hinduism.  Savarkar
(1923) viewed Sanskrit as part of the cultural glue that could bind together all Hindus
(even the atheist ones), dubbing it “a common inheritance” and “a common treasure”
(p. 35).  It  did  not  appear  to  bother  Savarkar  that  very  few  modern  people  know
Sanskrit, aside from ritual specialists and scholars (a number of the latter are not even
of South Asian descent). For Savarkar, Sanskrit was not valuable as a language in which
premodern Indians wrote philosophy, poetry, and more, but rather as a cultural symbol
for  unifying  Hindus  around  Hindutva.  More  recently,  the  BJP  has  devoted  state
resources to Sanskrit education in primary and secondary schools in India, but even
then,  their  goal  does  not  appear  to  be  actually  teaching  students  Sanskrit
(Gohain 2017). In fact, Hindutva ideologues frequently become irate when people try to
read premodern Sanskrit works, especially if they translate them so a wider audience
can appreciate ancient India’s literary masterpieces.12 Rejecting Sanskrit as a medium
for  a  wide  range  of  premodern  texts,  Hindu  nationalists  instead  seek  to  instill  an
emotion-soaked reverence for Sanskrit as a focal point of modern Hindutva.
15 One example of how positioning Sanskrit as a Hindutva symbol reaches absurdity, from
a scholarly perspective, is in the appointment of Rajiv Malhotra as honorary professor
at Jawaharlal Nehru University in 2018. Malhotra is a plagiarist and ideologue with no
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academic credentials, and so his appointment ruffled some feathers (Scroll Staff 2018).
It came several years into a sustained project to undercut humanities education at JNU,
which, for decades, has been a world-class university in Delhi. Malhotra was appointed
because of his work on Sanskrit, a language in which he has no formal training and
over which he appears to have a rather weak grasp (this being perhaps part of why he
plagiarized a  Sanskrit  scholar).  In a  move so brazen it  appears  almost  self-trolling,
Malhotra delivered his first lecture as an honorary professor at JNU on “Sanskrit Non-
Translatables.” It strikes me as unsurprising that Sanskrit appears untranslatable from
Malhotra’s perspective, similar to how Polish—a language I do not know although it
constitutes part of my cultural and ethnic heritage—appears to me. But, for the Hindu
Right, Malhotra’s shaky knowledge of Sanskrit is not disqualifying because they value
other credentials, specifically that Malhotra has the right heritage (Indian), the right
religion (Hindu), and, above all, that he toes the Hindu nationalist line. In Malhotra’s
JNU lecture, more than irony died. That Malhotra was able to infiltrate a well-respected
academic  space,  such as  the  humanities  at  JNU,  signals  the  rapid  expansion of  the
Hindutva  agenda  to  have  propagandists  occupy  and  thereby  undermine  spaces  of
academic inquiry.
16 Despite Hindutva’s non-religious background, its twenty-first century development has
leaned decisively towards a divine figure: Ram. Ram (also spelled Rama) is a character
in  the  ancient  Indian  epic  Ramayana,  where  he  is  depicted  as  a  just  king  and  an
incarnation of Vishnu. Many Hindus around the world consider themselves devotees of
Lord Ram today. But, the Hindutva Ram is different; he is a rallying cry for right-wing
Hindus  to  express  an identity  as  a  strong,  martial  race.  The Hindutva  Ram who is
featured  on  posters  even  looks  markedly  different,  notably  far  more  aggressive  as
compared to standard religious depictions of  Ram. Over time, the martial  Hindutva
Ram  threatens  to  supplant  the  devotional  Hindu  one.  Already,  the  once  religious-
sounding phrase “Jai Shri Ram” is often heard as a cry of hate that has filled the ears of
many Muslims in their final moments before being murdered by Hindu mobs (Scroll
Staff 2019). More broadly, Pradeep Chhibber (2019) has argued that “the BJP has been
successful in its campaign in delinking religious ideas and moral principles from what
it means to be a Hindu.”13
 
Hindutva Ram vs. Devotional Ram
Images found online
17 In August 2020, the BJP and other Hindu nationalist groups celebrated breaking ground
for a new temple to the Hindutva Ram, known popularly as Ram Mandir, in Ayodhya.
Ayodhya already has many Ram temples, but this new one is special because it sits on
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what has  been claimed to  be Ram’s  birthplace since the mid-nineteenth century,  a
period of time when British colonial policies and attitudes were stoking Hindu-Muslim
conflict.  As  Gyan  Pandey  (1994)  has  pointed  out,  the  Hindu  Right  has,  over  time,
embraced  an  increasingly  narrow  and  exclusive  positivism  in  the  identification  of
Ram’s birthplace. Additionally, and crucially, the temple is being built atop the remains
of a premodern Indian mosque that was torn down—illegally—by a Hindu mob in 1992.
That event sparked violence across northern India in which a few thousand people
were killed, mainly Muslims. The new Ram Mandir in Ayodhya celebrates this violent
exercise of Hindu supremacy, in which a modern myth about the past can justify the
mass slaughter of Muslims. Appropriately, if horrifyingly, Narendra Modi showed up
for the Ram Mandir groundbreaking ceremony appearing as an incarnation of a martial
Ram, complete with a crown (Express Web Desk 2020).
18 In the kaleidoscope of ways in which Hindu nationalists imagine the past, they rarely
glimpse actual Indian history. As noted above, they consider Indian history and, by
extension,  historians,  to  be  threats  that  might  unravel  their  elaborate  tapestry  of
propaganda. Hindutva ideology is also rife with internal contradictions and therefore
constantly at risk of collapsing on itself. The culminative effect is to render Hindutva as
something like a house of cards, unsteady in its own construction and at risk of falling
apart  due  to  the  slightest  breeze  of  historical  criticism.  At  the  moment,  however,
Hindutva does not appear to be crumbling, but rather flourishing, in part due to their
harsh tactics against dissenters. In the next section, I explore some Hindutva tactics,




19 What Hindutva ideologues lack in historical grounding, they compensate for in hateful
and sometimes inchoate screaming, both literal and metaphorical. Hindutva followers
often self-identify as an “army” or, to use other martial terms, are ruthless against
those they perceive as enemies. They disseminate bad-faith ideas and perpetrate odious
attacks in many venues, including WhatsApp, propaganda websites, email chains, and
so forth. The most visible arena that Hindu nationalists treat as a battleground is social
media, where they smear, dox, and threaten people with great regularity. Christophe
Jaffrelot  has  pointed  out  that  social  media  has  empowered  Hindutva  advocates  to
“disseminate this ideology anonymously, and therefore more aggressively” (Anderson
and Jaffrelot 2018:473).  Others have reconstructed how the BJP maintains and gives
targeted orders to its troll army (Chaturvedi 2016). As someone who has been the target
of a coordinated Hindu Right attack, it is both unmistakable and distressing. For many
scholars, the fear that this might one day happen to them provides enough incentive to
keep  their  historical  arguments  squarely  within  academic  publications,  which  few
people read, rather than trying to speak to broader popular audiences. 
20 Targeting scholars on social media and other forums works to dissuade academics from
discussing  history  in  popular  contexts  and  even  in  academic  publications  to  some
degree for several reasons. One, it is difficult, even traumatic, to be maligned with ad
hominem attacks. Such assaults also shape one’s reputation among other academics,
often not for the better. Elsewhere I have written about both of these aspects drawing
from my own experiences (Truschke 2020). In addition to reputation, tangible costs are
Hindutva’s Dangerous Rewriting of History
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 24/25 | 2020
8
often at play. In India, ad hominem attacks are coupled with threats to personal safety
from  both  the  police  and  Hindu  Right  mobs,  two  groups  that  increasingly  work
together in Modi’s India. For scholars abroad, the Indian state holds the ability to bar
travel to India using a variety of mechanisms. For both, the threat of lawsuits in India
encourages self-censorship of published work.14 Some scholars speak out despite all of
these risks, but more seem to stay mute, moderate themselves, or limit their comments
to academic circles, which saves them from the wrath of the Hindu Right, at least for a
while.
21 Hindu nationalists seek to displace scholarly knowledge and scholars by undermining
academic institutions. JNU in Delhi has been a notable target. For example, in 2017 the
Modi government slashed funding for JNU students pursuing PhDs, cutting down the
number of seats by more than eighty percent (Maanvi 2017). Since then, BJP allies have
taken  further  aggressive  steps  at  JNU,  including  decimating  the  library  budget
(Benu 2019), attempting to prevent archival research (Sarfaraz 2019), and, in January
2020, facilitating a violent attack on students led by a right-wing mob (Schultz and
Raj 2020). Cumulatively, these actions have made places like JNU unsafe at times and
not conductive to scholarly research. 
22 Hindu nationalists have also turned their attention to broader perceptions of history in
primary and secondary school textbooks, in India and in the United States. In discrete
textbook  controversies,  Hindutva  ideologues  have  sought  to  hide  or  eliminate
altogether aspects of Hindu traditions over time that they find distasteful, most notably
the  caste  system and  practices  of  untouchability  (Visveswaran  et al. 2009).  In  India
especially, they have sought to erase Muslim figures (like Akbar) and leaders of secular
independent  India  (like  Nehru)  from  textbooks,  replacing  them  with  historical
individuals they imagine (falsely) to have been seeking to establish a Hindu Rashtra in
premodernity, like Shivaji (HT Correspondent 2017; The Wire Staff 2017). In an embrace
of  Hindutva’s  own roots,  some Indian textbooks openly praise  Hitler  and Mussolini
(Traub 2018). In a truly Orwellian exercise, Hindu nationalists have already rewritten
textbooks in Kashmir to omit any mention of the internet shutdown, detentions, and
more that marked the Modi government’s decision to abrogate Article 370 of the Indian
Constitution in August 2019 (Maqbool 2020).  Hindutva attempts to change textbooks
have  been  more  effective  in  India  than  the  United  States  thus  far,  but  they  have
successfully  subordinated  academic  viewpoints  to  political  ones  in  both  nations
(Chowdhury 2018; Jain and Lasseter 2018; Sharma 2019; Thaker 2018).
23 Hindutva ideologues cannot change what actually happened in the Indian past,  but
they can control what people know about it, especially within India. They have a fear-
driven  need  to  control  a  narrative  that  could  fracture  their  entire  ideology.  That
coupled with a toxic cocktail of harsh methods—including displacement, violence, and
lies—has resulted in a notable degree of influence over the narrative of Indian history.
Currently, the price of doing historical work is far too high for many academics. In




24 Historians have limited options about how to proceed given the current Indian political
environment where Hindutva dominates, none of which are appealing. We can stay the
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course and do our jobs, trying to reconstruct and understand the past on its own terms,
but then some of us will be publicly smeared, have our safety threatened, be unable to
travel to India, face punitive lawsuits, and potentially far worse. In terms of influencing
public opinion about history, it is not clear that we have the right tool set to succeed
against the Hindu Right. Any debate with Hindutva ideologues features sophistry more
than substance, and the ethics of historians prevent us from copying their dishonesty
and bellicose demeanor. But, if we bow to political pressure and do not continue the
pursuit of history or do so only within the ivory tower, then we cede entirely the realm
of public-facing historical work and fail to help people understand the perverse nature
of Hindutva approaches to the past. That, too, is too high of a price to pay for some of
us. As a result, despite the danger, I remain engaged in attempts at “bridging the gap
between academic  and popular  history,”  as  Chitralekha Zutshi  called  for  in  a  2009
article.  My  goal  is  not  to  talk  to  Hindu  nationalists,  who  have  rejected  the  very
foundation of historical thought, but rather to talk about them and around them in
pursuit of promoting knowledge about Indian history. So long as there are still people
listening to both Hindutva ideologues and historians, a middle ground as it were, some
academics must continue to speak on behalf of historical approaches to studying and
understanding the Indian past.
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ABSTRACTS
Hindu nationalists are heavily invested in rewriting Indian history to advance their modern and
unrepentantly hateful political agenda. Hindu nationalism or Hindutva is a political ideology that
advocates Hindu supremacy, specifically over Muslims who comprise around fourteen percent of
modern India’s population. The similarity in name notwithstanding, Hindutva is distinct from
Hinduism, a broad-based religious tradition, although Hindutva ideologues seek to constrict and
flatten  Hindu  traditions.  In  this  article,  I  describe  some  of  the  contours  of  the  Hindutva
investment in remaking the past as a means of advancing a modern political project. I also offer
some thoughts on why Hindu nationalists care so much about history and explore some of the
implications of Hindutva’s growing political influence for the field of South Asian history and
academics who work therein.
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